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FIDELITY IN CONTEXT
John Courtney Murray (1904-1967)
Thomas Hughson

Jthe three theologians whose centenaries this special number of The—
OHN COURTNEY MURRAY, BERNARD LONERGAN AND KARL RAHNER

Way is celebrating—are important figures because they helped the
Roman Catholic church develop, even if rather belatedly, a carefully
positive relationship to modernity. All three showed that something in
the Church loved something, even if not everything, in ‘the modern
world’.1
Internationally, Murray may be the least familiar of the
centenarians.2 He was an expert on Church-state relations and on
religious liberty, and is best known for his work in producing Dignitatis
humanae, the 1965 Declaration on Religious Freedom at Vatican II, a
document which marked a turning-point in the self-understanding of
Roman Catholics within pluralist and secular societies.3
Murray’s work is a model of reflective inculturation. He recognised
that the democratic heritage of the United States had something to
offer Catholic tradition; the flow of teaching between Rome and the
local church needed to be two-way rather than one-way.

1

Of course it was not just Jesuits who were involved in this project, and perhaps we should mention
with special honour another great figure born in 1904, the Dominican, Yves Congar.
2
A still helpful introduction to Murray is Donald Pelotte, John Courtney Murray: Theologian in Conflict
(New York: Paulist, 1976).
3
Murray’s We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition, with a new
introduction by Walter J. Burghardt (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1988 [1960]) is readily accessible.
Other writings have been edited by J. Leon Hooper in Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with
Pluralism, John Courtney Murray (Louisville, Ky: Westminster/John Knox, 1993) and in Bridging the
Sacred and the Secular: Selected Writings of John Courtney Murray, S.J. (Washington: Georgetown UP,
1994). Murray’s works are now most easily accessible through the on-line bibliography being
developed by J. Leon Hooper at the Woodstock Theological Center in Georgetown University,
Washington DC: http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstock/library /0_murraybib.html.
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Murray
focused
on
universal truths spelt out in
the Declaration of Independence and implicit in the
Constitution and Bill of
Rights: that all people are
created equal; that all are
endowed by the Creator with
certain inalienable rights;
that among these rights are
those to life, to liberty, and
to the pursuit of happiness.
The appeal to such truths
was, for Murray, a matter of
reason, and did not invoke
Christian revelation or the
Bible directly. Murray’s
Catholic, natural-law style of
moral theology, informed as
it was by a neo-Thomist
confidence in reason, overlapped with the Enlightenment deism of Thomas Jefferson. Both Murray and Jefferson tried to
ground political claims on beliefs that God existed, that human beings
were created, and that to follow the natural law on the basis of reason
was to participate in the eternal law of divine reason. Problematic
though Murray’s confidence may now seem to some, he was still asking
an important question: can an appeal to universal human reason serve
as a basis for universal human rights?
Murray’s work was obviously shaped by his experience as a citizen
of the USA. But he had broad international experience and a truly
catholic breadth of vision. He had studied at the Gregorian University
in Rome in the late 1930s as a young Jesuit; he had spent time in
Germany while enrolled at the Gregorian; his doctoral dissertation,
submitted in 1937, was on Matthias Scheeben’s doctrine on faith.4 He

4

See Matthias Scheeben on Faith: The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray, edited by D.
Thomas Hughson (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1987).

Fidelity in Context

97

continually read historical works, and throughout his career he
pursued an interest in ecumenical and interreligious cooperation for
the common good of society. He was well aware of the defects of US
culture.
After studies at the Gregorian, Murray began teaching courses on
grace and the Trinity to Jesuit seminarians at Woodstock College in
Maryland, but rather soon stepped from the seminary into a more
public role. In 1941 he took up the task of editing a new journal
sponsored by the US Jesuits, Theological Studies.
Murray’s research and reflection encouraged Catholic participation
in the ecumenical, interreligious and pluralist civil life of the post-war
United States, even when it met with some considerable opposition in
Catholic circles. In the public sphere, he occasioned controversy by
arguing in defence of government aid to Catholic schools. He was also
noted for his advocacy of a ‘public philosophy’, grounded in natural
law. Meanwhile, Jesuit seminarians knew Murray as a revered preacher
of eight-day Ignatian retreats.
Murray might fairly be compared to Robert Bellarmine. Their
views on the extent of papal power might have differed, but both were
men of high public profile, service to the Church, and profound
spirituality. Both, too, were regularly involved in public controversy.
Murray, Vatican II and Religious Freedom
By the time Pope John XXIII convoked the Second Vatican Council in
1959, Murray had become—despite the controversy that his positions
occasioned—the foremost US Catholic theorist on religious liberty.
Before the 1960 presidential election, the Kennedy campaign staff
consulted him on Church-state relations in connection with Kennedy’s
famous Houston speech on Catholicism and the presidency.5 Kennedy
here defused fears that a Catholic in the White House would be
subject to a Pope telephoning instructions to guide presidential
decisions. After the Kennedy victory, Time magazine featured Murray
on its cover.6

5

‘Address of Senator John F. Kennedy to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association’, Rice Hotel,
Houston, Texas, 12 September 1960: http://www.cs.umb.edu/jfklibrary/j091260.htm.
6
The portrait of John Courtney Murray SJ reproduced on the previous page was painted by Boris
Chaliapin, and appeared on the cover of Time magazine on 12 December 1960, under the headline
‘US Catholics and the State’. The original portrait hangs in the lobby of America House, the office of
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At Vatican II, following the second session, Murray was appointed
‘first scribe’ for the commission charged with producing a text on
religious liberty. Though he was by no means the only author of
Dignitatis humanae, he had an important role in shaping it. In the
commission, Murray steadily argued through five drafts that religious
liberty was best understood as primarily a political and legal reality
owing its existence chiefly to modern consciousness and institutions. A
decree on religious liberty should not appear as a Catholic initiative.
The Council was approving ideas, practices and institutions that were
already familiar, and accomplishing a belated aggiornamento that would
bring the Church abreast with the modern world. Admittedly, Catholic
tradition had always taught that faith was essentially free, but it had
also consistently rejected, both in theory and practice, the idea of a
human and civil right to religious liberty at large. This suggested a
need for modesty, and even for a little chagrin. Triumphalism was out
of place.
Religion and Politics as a Dualism

Murray’s line of argument at the Council was of a piece with his
general reluctance to deduce particular political options from Christian
sources. Instead he saw the gospel as a biblical leaven working from
within upon Western political self-understanding and practice.
Unobtrusively, Christianity had helped prepare the modern
consciousness of human dignity and also the legal institutions designed
to protect that dignity. Murray was well aware of the protracted
conflicts between Church authorities and political leaders from the
time of Constantine onwards. When popes had asserted their
prerogative in teaching and in ministry, they were asserting
Christianity’s emancipation from an undifferentiated sacral state which
treated religion as just another sphere of existence subject to its
authority. The mustard seed sown with the post-Constantinian papal
defence of libertas ecclesiae (the freedom of the Church) became a tree
of faith that sheltered civil society as a whole, and whose shade would
nurture demands for individual freedom in religion.

America magazine (www.americamagazine.org). Copyright 2004, America Press, Inc. All rights
reserved.
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At the same time, however, Christianity would frequently be
tempted to go too far, and to seek to control society and culture.
Examples are not hard to find. Augustine invoked civil authority
against the Donatists; Aquinas argued for governmental action against
heretics; Innocent III claimed that all temporal as well as spiritual
power had passed from Jesus to Peter and thence to the popes, and on
that basis he argued that popes had the right to seat and unseat
emperors and kings.
Murray, by contrast, asserted that Christianity had introduced a
radical duality between politics and religion:
… the essential political effect of Christianity was to destroy the
classical view of society as a single homogeneous structure, within
which the political power stood forth as the representative of
society both in its religious and in its political aspects. Augustus
was both Summus Imperator and Pontifex Maximus; the ius divinum
was simply part of the ius civile; and outside the empire there was
no civil society, but only barbarism. The new Christian view was
based on a radical distinction between the order of the sacred and
the order of the secular: ‘Two there are, august Emperor, by which
this world is ruled on title of original and sovereign right—the
consecrated authority of the priesthood and the royal power’. In
this celebrated sentence of Gelasius I, written to the Byzantine
Emperor Anastasius I in 494 AD, the emphasis laid on the word
‘two’ bespoke the revolutionary character of the Christian
7
dispensation.

New Testament warrant for such a view could be found in Jesus’ saying
about rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the
things that are God’s (Mark 12:17). It had been Leo XIII’s
achievement to retrieve this dualism; developing its modern
significance was to be Murray’s task throughout his career. The
pluralist democracy of the United States, with its lack of an established
Church and its protection of the free exercise of religion, implicitly
rested on such a dualism. By contrast, a totalitarian state was always
seeking monism: in modernity, the subsumption of the Church’s
authority by the state or vice versa.

7

Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Propositio, 202.
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Within such a twofold vision, freedom cut both ways. The state
guaranteed the exercise of religion; equally, medieval kings could claim
independence from ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the sphere of political
judgment and action. Murray came increasingly to follow the teaching
of Thomas Aquinas and John of Paris that the political structures in
any society are temporal, and can be assessed in terms of the natural
law. He came to disagree with Robert Bellarmine’s proposal that in
religious emergencies a pope could temporarily or indirectly exercise
authority over a political area for a good spiritual end.8 If apostolic
jurisdiction is exerted only on the spiritual level, this purity greatly
enhances the preaching of the gospel. Conversely, it is inappropriate
for the state or the government to repress heresy by civil means, even if
a pope or a bishop demands such measures for the sake of society’s
spiritual welfare. Political authority has no mandate from the Creator
to define or decide questions of religious belief and practice, or of
ecclesiastical order. Its role—an important but limited one—is to
provide for public safety, order and morality.
The Richness of the Anglo-Saxon Legacy

Though Murray asserted the relative autonomy of human reason, he
was at one with the papacy’s consistent refusal to assign supremacy to
individual reason, especially when this was extended in the form of a
nation-state’s supreme authority in all zones of social existence
(‘totalitarianism’). But the continental state absolutism, which Leo
XIII knew from the aftermath of the French
The Church Revolution, was not the only model on the Western
was unaware scene. There was also the Anglo-American tradition
of Anglo- of constitutional government, which Murray
American considered to have been unknown to Leo XIII. There
constitutionalism had been a medieval wisdom that recognised the
dependence of political authority on the consent of
the governed. This wisdom had been lost in the Catholic nations of
Latin Europe, but it had been preserved in England, where the Magna
carta of 1215 had been the first of a long series of curtailments of
monarchical power. From there, this tradition had passed to the United
States.

8

See Murray, ‘St Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power’, Theological Studies, 9 (1948), 491-535.
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For Murray, therefore, the Bill of Rights was not a piece of
eighteenth-century rationalist theory, but rather the product of a
Christian history carrying the idea of a natural law. Latin Europe’s
concept of an absolute monarch ruling by divine right was, for Murray,
a bad idea with demonstrably negative consequences. Governance
under a constitution regulated the exercise of power by the rule of
known public law. It protected Pope Gelasius’ concern for Christian
freedom in a way that was quite impossible if a king could say, ‘l’état,
c’est moi’.
Fostering Political Culture

Murray’s vision required a vigorous public consensus in support of the
principles enshrined in a constitution. He was therefore preoccupied,
to a quite striking extent, with what today would be called political
culture and civil society. The state and the government exist for the
good of society and of the people, not the other way around, even if
states and governments often develop a momentum of their own that
opposes this principle. The external and juridical structures of
democracy may be necessary for collective well-being, but they are not
sufficient to ensure it. The key to a democratic society’s health lies not
simply in the proper functioning of political institutions, but in the
vigour and sanity of its social life. General education and culture are as
significant as civil structures. In their attempts to support democracies
around the world, Western powers may look too much to elections,
written laws, and willingness to compromise, while neglecting the
essential roles of education, political culture, and formation in human
dignity. The founding of the United States emerged from an informal
civil and Christian culture, not from a preconceived, doctrinaire plan.
Democracy can flourish in a society only if there are cultural resources
supportive of self-government.
Conciliar Debates

In Murray’s vision, therefore, religious freedom depends on a
recognition that the state’s authority is limited and does not extend to
religion. But this was not the only theology of religious freedom to
have influenced the final decree of Vatican II. Other thinkers on the
relevant commission focused on individual human rights. In this view
the human and civil right to religious liberty revolves around the
freedom of individual conscience, or—in more Catholic language—the

102

Thomas Hughson

dignity of the human person in so far as it avoids arbitrary personal
preference and follows its innate obligation to the truth. During the
final stages of the Declaration’s preparation, Murray fell ill and was
hospitalised; consequently, the final text of the Declaration gave
greater prominence to this alternative approach than it might
otherwise have done. Murray saluted its publication with two cheers,
not three.9
Murray was not, of course, against freedom of conscience and the
dignity of the person. Moreover, he was well aware that Christianity
provided a deeper, Christocentric and communal vision of these
secular values, one that the Council had rehabilitated as regards life
within the Church. Whereas Thomas Jefferson had rewritten the Bible
in such a way as to marginalise any claim that Jesus was divine, Murray
was a Christian humanist who understood all reality in reference to the
incarnate Word, to grace and to the Church. Dignitatis humanae was
part of Roman Catholicism’s recovery of a sense of Christian freedom
after several generations of reaction against the Reformation and the
Enlightenment.
For Murray it was a mistake, however, to attempt to ground
religious freedom by such means. Appeals to Christian humanism were
likely to be problematic in a pluralist society. More importantly,
religious freedom emerged from an acknowledgment that the state’s
power was intrinsically limited. Admittedly it was in one respect
fortunate that Murray’s influence on the final Vatican II text was
restrained, for the document as it stands overlaps more clearly with
Protestant understandings of religious freedom and so better serves the
ecumenical goal of the Council. But Murray’s own approach remains
important. It testifies to a vision of personal liberty as both
participating in the social and political dimensions of life and
transcending them. By contrast, an approach to religious freedom
centred on the individual’s dignity will always tend towards making the
social and political appear as an extrinsic appendage.

9
For some post-conciliar reflection by Murray on the Declaration, see ‘The Issue of Church and State
at Vatican Council II’, in Religious Liberty, 199-227, and ‘The Declaration on Religious Freedom’, in
Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, 187-199.
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Murray’s Conflicts
The importance of the differences between the theologies of religious
liberty inside the drafting commission at Vatican II can probably be
overstated. True, all Murray’s previous research and reflection came
into play; the stakes were high; the differences were real; the
arguments were sharp. But the commission’s work was nevertheless, for
all its strenuousness, collaborative. The conflict was subordinate to a
common purpose.
The crucial conflict on religious liberty at Vatican II occurred not
so much between the specialists as on the floor. Ultimately, the
question was whether Catholic tradition was to be
understood in a classicist way, or rather in terms of Vatican II’s
historical consciousness. Those bishops who opposed the Declaration
project of a conciliar affirmation of religious liberty saw it and doctrinal
as contradicting Catholic tradition, especially Leo XIII. In development
response Murray composed ‘The Problem of Religious
Freedom’, which became available to the assembled bishops after the
third session of the Council, which ended in November 1964.10 Murray
distinguished between Leonine doctrine and Leonine polemic. The
Council had the challenging option either of developing the doctrine
or of staying with the polemic. The bishops’ ultimate decision to affirm
religious liberty was for Murray the signal instance of doctrinal
development at Vatican II.
Just as trying for Murray were conflicts that had occurred before
the Council. Both before and during the Council, the controversies
arose from Murray’s attempt to articulate the originality of US
Catholicism, an originality that neither US Protestants nor European
Catholics could easily understand.
The First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

Protestants in the late 1940s and 1950s were genuinely doubtful about
Catholic commitment to this principle enshrined in the First

10

The text is available in Religious Liberty, and on http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstock
/murray/rel-liberty/rl-chap2a.htm.
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Amendment to the US Constitution. There was no doubt about
Catholics’ practice in this regard. But was that practice principled?
People in the US could read Leo XIII’s fulminations against religious
liberty and Church-state separation, written in almost complete
ignorance of Anglo-American constitutionalism; they could remember
Vatican policy in making Church-state concordats; they could see how
Franco’s Spain was regarded by some in the Vatican as exemplifying
the ideal form of Church-state relations. Were US Catholics merely
missionaries for these European patterns? Was their conformity to US
political culture merely a provisional expediency, an adjustment to
national facts that they wished were otherwise and that they might
seek to change if they became numerous enough? Would they prefer
Catholicism to be established as a state religion? These questions were
impertinent when addressed to families whose children had perished in
military service under an oath to uphold the US Constitution.
Nevertheless, they needed principled, theoretical answers.
Murray’s extensive writing on Church-state matters was a
prolonged demonstration that the Church’s reactionary stances were
conditioned by particular historical circumstances, and were not
intrinsically Catholic. On the contrary, there were deep coherences
between Catholicism and the US American experiment. Rome’s
condemnation of ‘democracy’ referred primarily to forms of
government that had sprung up in the French Revolution and in its
aftermath. Anglo-American constitutionalism was different.11
In 1960, Murray published We Hold These Truths: Catholic
Reflections on the American Proposition. This was his culminating
statement of how and why Roman Catholics could participate with full
integrity in US civil life. At its basis was a theory of Church-state
relations summed up in four principles:
1) the irreducible difference between Church and state as to
their origins, activities and purposes;
2) the primacy in human life of the Church, of faith, and of
the spiritual over the merely political—a primacy expressed
not so much through jurisdiction or control as through the

11

See John Courtney Murray and the American Civil Conversation, edited by Robert P. Hunt and
Kenneth L. Grasso (Grand Rapids, Mi: Eerdmans, 1992).
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witness of Christians, especially the laity, formed in the
gospel’s vision and values;
3) the integrity of the political order and its independence
from ecclesiastical jurisdiction—the state’s competence is
to protect its citizens’ religious liberty, and in performing
that function (cura religionis) and no other, it serves the
higher end which is Christianity;
4) the existence of some manner of harmony between Church
and state, given that people have to belong to both
simultaneously.
Much of Murray’s work was concerned with the third principle. For
Murray there was a valid modern differentiation between the sacred
and the secular, one that was true both to the general Catholic
tradition on Church and state, and to the particular development of
that tradition undertaken by Leo XIII.
The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 seemed to settle in
practice what Murray had demonstrated in theory. The outcome of the
voting showed that there was no reason why a Catholic citizen could
not be elected President; Kennedy’s exercise of the office showed that
a Catholic President was not subject to the authority of the Pope as
temporal ruler as if US Catholics were subjects in the former Papal
States. On the Church’s side, the Council’s 1965 Decree on
Ecumenism marked further progress, and seemed finally to mark the
end of antagonism between Protestant and Catholic Christianity.
In 2004, the situation has changed. The campaign of John Kerry
has brought to the surface deep conflicts within the Catholic body, as
well as in other Christian Churches. Murray’s wisdom might usefully
be retrieved as a resource for resolving these conflicts too.
Silencing

Murray’s work led him also into difficulties with Catholic authority.
The kind of vision Murray put forward clashed sharply with that of
figures such as Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, pro-Prefect of the Holy
Office, and indeed, in the US, the Catholic University theologian
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Joseph Fenton, editor of the American Ecclesiastical Review.12 In 1955,
Murray was forbidden by his superiors in Rome to publish an important
article, and ordered to stop writing on the Church-state problem.13 It
was only with the election of John XXIII in 1958 that the situation was
relaxed.
In the end, Murray’s views carried the day, and the conflicts with
Ottaviani were at some level resolved. He became—though only at the
second session—a peritus at Vatican II; he had a significant hand in
drafting the Declaration on Religious Freedom; he received a special
blessing from Paul VI. Moreover, Murray was at one with Leo XIII,
with the mainstream of Catholic social teaching, and with Vatican II in
developing a political theology on the basis of Aquinas rather than on
Augustine. For the tradition represented by Murray, the state is part of
created human nature, and therefore derives ultimately from the
Creator. By contrast, Augustine’s ‘earthly city derives from our turning
away from love and its source (God) towards wilfulness’.14
Dialogue and the Citizen
In a monarchy or non-democratic state, relations between Church and
state occur when the legitimate authorities of the two ‘perfect
societies’ meet and conduct business together: popes and emperors;
popes and kings; bishops and princes; clergy and magistrates. Leo XIII
taught that these relationships were not ends in themselves, or mere
expressions of the dignity of office; instead, they existed for the sake of
the people as a whole. The citizen or subject who was both under state
and Church authority, the civis idem et christianus, had duties to fulfill
in both societies. If Church and state authorities were at odds, and
commanded opposed acts, consciences would be divided, in a way that
seemed to undermine the peaceful conscience commended in the New
Testament.

12

Thus Fenton published Ottaviani’s ‘Church and State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the
Teaching of Pope Pius XII’, American Ecclesiastical Review, 127 (January-June 1953), 321-334.
13
The article in question was called ‘Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion’. It
was published posthumously in Religious Liberty, 49-125. An electronic version can be found at
http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstock/library/1955c.htm. For an account of Murray’s
difficulties in the 1950s, see Pelotte, John Courtney Murray, 27-73.
14

Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Augustine’, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, edited by Peter
Scott and William T. Cavanaugh (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 35-47, here 42.
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Pius XII took this line of thought a step further by identifying the
person as the source, agent and end of all societal processes. Implicitly,
then, Church-state relations were more than a set of accords made on
high and imposed ‘from above’. Rather, Church-state relations passed
through the people; ordinary people were their agents. Murray
expressed the point by stating that,
… what the Church immediately confronts is not the temporal
power in the sense of ‘the government’ or the state in the sense
of the constitutional and legal order of society, but rather the
15
citizen ….

The citizen is the state’s representative in its dealings with the Church;
the believer is the Church’s representative in its dealings with the
state. Church and state meet in the individual who is both baptized
believer and public citizen. Conscience becomes the meeting-hall, with
believer and citizen in continual, usually quiet, session.
It follows that ecclesiastical authority cannot legitimately intervene
in a Catholic citizen’s conscience by imposing a command to perform
or act on a particular political judgment. Prudential judgment,
rather, is an inalienable function of the believer’s own Prudential
conscience, formed but not determined by Catholic faith and judgment is
morality. Of course Church authority has the right to preach for the
and teach the gospel in such a way as to bring out its believer’s own
implications for public life and for the political order of society, conscience
and therefore to imply judgments on the morality or otherwise
of specific public policies. But it may not seek to replace or determine
juridically the prudential judgment which the individual believer
inevitably has to make. Ecclesiastical authority does not extend to the
properly political judgments of the informed citizen. If it tries to do so,
it violates the hard-won differentiation between the temporal and the
spiritual, and undermines the Church’s spiritual mission. Conversely,
the state has no right to command citizens to perform religious acts,
such as attendance at worship, or the recitation of prayers.
Murray’s idea, following Leo XIII, that Church-state relations
should ideally be harmonious so that individual consciences can be

15

‘Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and State in the Light of History’,
Theological Studies, 10 (1949), 177-234, here 223.
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untroubled does not mean peace at any price. Nor does it imply that
believers are to treat their faith and their political views as on a par.
Faith and discipleship remain all-encompassing principles of
interpretation, not to be subordinated to political convictions. But one
cannot make a simple jump from Christian faith to prudential
decisions on specific laws or policies. There has to be deliberation,
analysis, discussion, reading, and reflection precisely on the political
level. The use of biblical and doctrinal texts as slogans represents not a
fidelity to Christianity but an irresponsible fideism.
Durable and influential Church-state relationships occur in human
consciences, not in legislatures or Vatican halls. For Murray,
conscience was to be protected, not because freedom was an end in
itself, but because conscience was the area in which the gospel and
political life could meet and interact. Church authorities were simply
to teach, and to help believers form their consciences in the light of
Catholic faith and morality. For their part, believers had a
corresponding duty to learn about what their faith might imply
The moral for the temporal order of society, including its morality.
and legal Prelates, however, were not to seek to influence legislatures
orders are over the heads of believer-citizens, or to steer democratic
distinct processes. Such attempts would violate an important boundary
between Church and state. It would follow—though Murray
never explicitly stated this conclusion—that no Church authority
could ever command believers to vote one way or another, to take this
or that political action. The moral and legal orders are distinct. How
one moves from the former to the latter depends greatly on the
historical, cultural and social context and conditions. Moreover social
peace is in itself a significant value, one that can legitimately restrain a
faith community from seeking to have the law enshrine its distinctive
moral vision.
Nearly forty years after Murray’s death, some of the tensions he
lived with continue. He is a character in a plot that is as yet without a
climax, resolution or denouement, part of the larger historical drama
arising from the tensions between Catholicism and US political life. No
longer are his positions taken for granted.16

16

See Michael J. Baxter, ‘John Courtney Murray’, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology,
150-164.
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There are some who are concerned by what they see as an
increasing secularisation in US political culture, and who have
criticized Murray’s vision of Catholicism and US democracy as
compatible. There is a serious issue here; clearly, not all of the many
different cross-currents within contemporary political culture are
compatible with Catholicism or indeed Christianity. But Murray’s
claim centred only on the basic institutions of democracy and on the
consensus underlying them. The criticisms do not really undermine the
traditional Catholic distinction between the moral and the legal
orders. Nor should they be taken as a challenge to Pius XII’s position
on the high value for any society of social peace—even if Murray’s
critics remind us that social peace should not be understood in too
static a fashion.
In the present context, Murray’s most provocative contribution
may indeed be his insistence that it is specific judgments of truth that
can shape national identity and ground a consensus supporting the US
constitution—not value preferences, not dominance by interest groups
or by a majority, not agreed procedures alone. He was not the kind of
foundationalist thinker who held that everything could be derived
from first principles, but his basic theory of church, state, society and
politics built on the primacy of truths in consensus.
Murray’s message needs to be heard anew, particularly given the
increasing religious pluralism not only of the United States, but of the
West at large. His careful exploration of how the Roman Catholic
tradition can flourish when Church and state are separated may have
wider implications for religious traditions in general. A separation of
Church and state not only protects a religious tradition from political
interference; it also fosters spiritual integrity.

Thomas Hughson SJ was ordained priest in 1971 and has been teaching at
Marquette University, Milwaukee, since 1979, notably in the areas of Christian
discipleship and of Church-State relations. He is an Editorial Consultant for
Theological Studies, and co-initiated the Society for the Study of Anglicanism in
the American Academy of Religion.

